NYLS Journal of International and
Comparative Law
Volume 12
Number 1 VOLUME 12 NUMBERS 1 & 2 1991

Article 6

1991

DELIMITING THE WORLD COURT'S JURISDICTION: REALISM IN
THE INTEREST OF PROGRESS
Michael Lizzi

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/
journal_of_international_and_comparative_law
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lizzi, Michael (1991) "DELIMITING THE WORLD COURT'S JURISDICTION: REALISM IN THE INTEREST OF
PROGRESS," NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 12 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol12/iss1/
6

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of
DigitalCommons@NYLS.

DELIMITING THE WORLD COURT'S
JURISDICTION: REALISM IN THE
INTEREST OF PROGRESS
1. INTRODUCTION
The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council-the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and
China-are currently reviewing a Proposal drafted by the chief legal
adviser to the State Department, Abraham D. Sofaer. The Proposal
concerns future acceptance of the International Court of Justice as the
proper forum for the settlement of international disputes. Its contents set
the parameters of that acceptance pursuant to a realistic assessment of the
Court's capacity to engage the trust and confidence of the nations of the
world. By its terms, although not so intended, it also captures the United
States in the act of reappraising its own relationship to the Court. If
approved, the Permanent Five will undertake to bind themselves to an
international agreement that will embody the terms of the Proposal. While
the Proposal itself has not been introduced into the public domain
(presumably for reasons of political prudence), Sofaer has outlined its
general terms in an article entitled Adjudication in the InternationalCourt
of Justice: Progress Through Realism.'

Elements of the Proposal
have
2

also been discussed in several articles of the New York Times.
The Proposal lists four general steps, which, in Sofaer's view, will
ensure greater acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction in the future: (1)
securing wider acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by means of the
3
example set by the Permanent Five's approval of the Proposal; (2)
allowing the approving nations following the Permanent Five's example to
I. Sofaer, Adjudication in the InternationalCourt of Justice: ProgressThroughRealism,44
REC.B. Clay N.Y. 462, 477-83 (1989).
2. Lewis, U.S., in Shijt Asks Arbitration in World Court N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1989, at A5,
eel. I [hereinafter Lewis, U.S., in Shift];Lewis, Moscow Permits World Court Role, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 3, 1988, at All, ml. 1; Lewis, U.S. Asking Soviets To Let World Court Settle
Some Disputes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at At, cal. I [hereinafter Lewis, U.S. Asking].
3. Sofaer, supra note 1, at 478-79.
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specify a) the treaties over which they will confer jurisdictional authority on
the Court and b) the areas or subject matter over which the Court may
4
exercise jurisdiction; (3) permitting nations to have disputes settled by
"Special Chambers" of the Courts and to participate in selecting the judges
of such Chambers; and (4) the provision of a binding international agreement
embodying
the Proposal's terms to which approving nations will become
6
parties.
This Note seeks to determine whether the Proposal reflects any
substantive change in the commitment of the United States to the adjudication of international disputes by the International Court of Justice. The
search for substantive change will be accomplished by a comparison between
the Proposal's central terms, namely, the sections respecting selection of
treaties and subject matter as well as Special Chambers, and the manner in
which the United States has submitted to the Court's jurisdiction or resisted
its exercise since the United States became a party to the Court's statute in
1945. This comparison will demonstrate that the Proposal largely represents
substantive continuity, rather than change, in terms of the types of disputes
the United States will permit the Court to adjudicate and the methods the
United States will employ in electing to use ad hoc Special Chambers to
settle a dispute.
What the Proposal does is "codify" the United States conception of the
Court's role in realistic and sober terms. Therefore, whether the Permanent
Five approve, modify, or reject the Proposal, it represents a marked departure
in the form in which the United States has committed itself to adjudication
by the Court. This formal, as opposed to substantive, departure is manifest
in the Proposal's explicit exclusion of particular subjects from the Court's
7
jurisdiction. This frank approach stands in sharp contrast to the ambiguous
4.Id. at 479-80.
5. An ad hocChamber is a tribunal which the Court may establish
at the request of the
parties pursuant to aticle 26(2) and(3)of the Court's statute. See Statute of the international
Court of Justice, art.
26, paras. 2-3 [hereinafter
tCJ Statute], reprinted in S. ROSENE, THE
WORLD COURT, WHAT
ITISANDHow ITWORKS
256 (1989).
The Court determines the
number of judges constituting a ad hoc
Chamber with the approval of the parties. ICJ
Statute,
supra,art. 26, par.
2. Articles 15through 21of the Rues of Court
concern Special Chambers.
Ruinof Court, arts. 15-21,reprinted in S. ROSENN, supra,
at 271-73. The 1972 and1978
revisions of the Rues of Court yielded
important substantive and
procedural changes facilitating
recourseu
to anad hoc Chamber andgiving parties a greater voice in its
composition. S.
RosENHrE,
supra, at 72.
6. Sofaer, supra note 1,at 482-84.
7. The International agreement
contemplated by the Proposal will
contain a provision
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United States Declaration of 1946. By means of the Declaration, the
United States accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction as to all legal
disputes concerning "any question of international law."9 The Declaration
included, however, a reservation (the Connally Reservation) stipulating that
the Court's jurisdiction did not encompass disputes falling within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the United
1°
States.
In its candidness, the Proposal lays the foundation for future accretions
to the Court's jurisdictional authority and aptly serves Sofaer's aim of paving
the way for progress through realism. By adopting Sofaer's Proposal and
presenting it to the remaining permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, the United States has adopted the goal of progress through
realism. In the interest of promoting this goal, however, the formal change
that the Proposal represents, should be kept separate from the substantive
continuity which underlies it. Otherwise, the opportunity, which Sofaer
proclaims is at hand, to promote recourse to the International Court of Justice
will indeed "be lost through excessive faith or undue skepticism.""
I.

THE PROPOSAL: REALISM IN THE INTEREST OF PROGRESS

The genesis of the Proposal may best be appreciated when viewed
against the background of the longstanding relationship between the United
"affimntively excluding issues concerning hostilities, armed conflict, individual and collective
self-defense, or resistance to aggresion." Sofae, supra note 1, at 480.
8. United States DeclarationAccepting the Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice (1946),reprinted in 1983-1984 I.CJ.Y.B. 90-91 [hereinafter United States
Declaration].
9. Id.
10 ld. at91. The Connally Reservation has been the subject of considerable criticism since
its appearance on the iternational stage. The Interhandel Case (Swit. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6,
is the only casein which the United States invoked the Connally Reservation. Judge
Lauterpacht, in his dissenting opinion, arguedthat because
thereservation is contraty to article
36(6)of theCourt'sstatute (requiring that the Court settie disputes as to jurisdiction, RULES
OF
COURT,
supra note 5, art. 36, par. 6., and because the reservation forms an essential part of
the declaration, the estire declaration is invalid. 1959 lC.J. at 101(Lauterpacht, J.,dissenting);
see also Goldschmidt, The Connally Amendment Revisited: Sterile and Effective Measures of
Protecting the ReservedDomain, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 72 (1965)("[ihere hasalways been
unanimity betweensupporters and adversaries of the Connolly Raervation thatthe self-judging
characterof theReservation
constitutes
the equivalent of a noncommitment.").
11. Sofaer,supranote 1, at462. Sofaerexplainsthatthe purpose
of the article is to suggest
a realistic approach, that is, theProposal,
which will reduce the risk thatthe resurgent interest
in international adjudication and thus use of the Court will be scuttled by inordinate
espectations and incredulous criticism. Id.
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States and the International Court of Justice. The United States became a
party to the Court's statute when, on October 24, 1945, the United Nations
2
Charter came into force pursuant to article 110 of the Charter.
The
United States had deposited itsinstrument of ratification on August 28,
1945." By virtue of article 93 of the Charter, the United States, as a
member of the United Nations, became "ipso facto" party to the Court's
14
statute, which was annexed to the Charter. The United States, as party
to the Court's statute, became potentially subject to the Court's jurisdiction
under article 36(1)." The Court's jurisdiction under article 36(1) extends
to cases submitted by special agreement of the parties and to cases arising
under treaties containing a clause (compromissory clause) designating the
1 6
Court as the forum for dispute settlement.
To date, the United States
has been a party to two disputes which were submitted to the Court by
7
special agreement, and four cases whose jurisdictional basis was derived
from a treaty's compromissory clause." The United States is currently
9
a party to seventy-one treaties containing compromissory clauses.
In 1946, the United States deposited itsDeclaration accepting the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2), which gave the Court
jurisdiction over all legal disputes concerning, inter
alia,
"any question of
26
international law."
The United States has been a party to four cases
12. Under article 110, theCharter
was to become effective when thepermanent five
members of theSecurity Council (same members as today) plus a majority of theother
signatories (twenty-nine nations outof the fifty-one signatories) deposited instruments of
ratification
with the United States government,
R.RUSSE.L,
A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
947-48
(1958).
13. Id. at 947.
14. U.N. CHARTER,
art.
93.
15. Article 36(1) of theCourt's statute provides in part: "The jurisdiction of the Court
comprises all cases which theparties refer to it and all matters specially provided for... in
treaties andconventions inforce." ICJ Statute, supranote 5, art.
36, para.1.
16. Id.
17. Case Concerning theDelimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf
of Maine Area
(Canada v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ.
246; Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI)
(U.S. v.
Italy), 1988 I.C.J. 158.
18. Monetary GoldCase (Italy
v. Albania), 1954 I.CJ. 19; United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3; Military and Paramilitary Activities in
andAgainst Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 l.CJ. 14; Aerial Incident of3 July 1988 (Ian v.
U.S.), 28 LL.M. 843 (Application Instituting Proceedings).
19. See F.Moreison, Treaties as a Source ofJurisdiction,
in THE INTERe ONA COURT
OF JusCe ATA CROSSROADS
58, 59 (L.Damrosch ed. 1987) (Monison does not include the
Genecide Convention, to whichthe United States became a party in 1988,
in his survey.).
20. ICJStatute, supranote 5, art. 36, para. 2(b).
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whose jurisdictional basis was derived from an article 36(2) declaration.
One commentator has remarked that the Declaration was an ill-fated
attempt to accommodate the opposing claims of unilateralists and
multilateralists.Y The result of the accommodation was a Declaration
that, by virtue of the Connally Reservation, at once proclaimed as absolute
23
and hedged United States
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.
Under the doctrine of reciprocity, a nation, which the United States had in
mind to bring before the Court to settle a dispute, could readily evade
jurisdiction by reciprocally invoking the Connally Reservation against the
24
United States. Thus, the Reservation actually provided the United States
with a disincentive to seek settlements of disputes on the basis of
This disincentive was reinforced when
compulsory jurisdiction.Y'
Bulgaria successfully invoked the Reservation in 1960 in a proceeding
26
instituted by the United States.
The United States finally resolved to
terminate its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction pursuant to its
Declaration in 1985.27 The impetus for this action was the Court's
determination that it had jurisdiction over Nicaragua's claims against the
23
United States concerning the Contra rebellion.
While these unfortunate events were taking place, other events
signaled that the cause of international dispute settlement had not suffered
any diminution in currency. United States ratification of multilateral
21. Case Concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco

(France v. U.S.), 1952I.CJ. 176;Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1960 I.C.J.

146;Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.)1959 I.C.J.6; Military and Paramilitary Activities inand
Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14.
22. T. FRANK, JutDaiG
THE WORLD
CouRT 24 (1986).

23. Id.
24. Shabtai Rosenne formoulates
the doctrine of reciprocity as it relates to compulsory
jurisdiction: "[W]hen
recourse is had to the compulsory jurisdiction, the reservations of each
declaration will be binding onboth parties, in the sense that each party is entitled to invoke to
its benefit any relevant reservation appearing in its own declaration or in that of the other
INTERNATIONAL
COtMTOr JUSncE
party." S. ROSENNE,THELAW AND PRACnC OFTHE

386

(1965).
25. D'Amato, The United States Should Accept, by a New Declaration, the General
Compulsory Jurisdictionof the World Court, 80 AM.J. INT'L
L. 331, 332 (proposing a new
declaration without the Connolly Reservation).
26. Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1960 I.C.J.146.
27. See Statement of the U.S. Department of State Concerning U.S. Wthdrawalfrom the
ProceedingsInitiated by Nicaragua Jan. 19 1985, 85 DEFT.
ST.BULL.No. 2096, at 64 (Mrlar.
1985)[hereinafter U.S.State Dept Statement].
28. Id
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treaties covering diverse areas of international concern was increasing,"
and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was significantly contributing
to the development of international law in the areas of foreign investment,
30
expropriation, valuation, and the rights of persons wrongfully expelled.
Additionally, the 1980s witnessed a small revolution in the use of Special
Chambers of the Court in the settlement of disputes including two to which
the United States was a party.
Finally, in September 1987, amid the
furor of perestroika,the premier of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev,
expressed his opinion on the Court's potential for "forming a system of
comprehensive [worldwide] security" and stated that the Court's "mandatory jurisdiction should be recognized by all on mutually agreed upon
32
conditions." The Soviet leader's reference to the Court coupled with the
other auspicious developments prompted the United States, through the
State Department, to formulate the Proposal, which the Security Council's
33
five permanent members are currently reviewing.
Sofaer interprets the
combination of these events as creating an extraordinary opportunity to
establish a 4new and more meaningful version of mandatory jurisdiction for
the Court?
Ill. APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSAL
In his article, Sofaer stresses the critical importance of securing for the
Proposal the approval of the Security Council's five permanent mem3
bers. He correctly observes that a Proposal which engages the participation of the world's major powers is likely to win widespread acceptance.'
This Note will not explore the implications of this observation but rather
will examine the United States Proposal in its present form and consider
the extent to which it reflects change in United States commitment to
adjudication by the International Court of Justice. The result of the
Permanent Five's deliberations will be the combined "Proposals" of the
United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China. The
29. Sofoer, supra note 1, at464.
30. Id at465.
31.Four cases were heard between 1982 and1987. See id.
at 481.
32. Gorbachev, The Reality
and Guaranteesof a Secure World, Pravda, Sept.
17, 1987, at
1-2.
33. Lewis, U.S.
Asking, supranote 2.
34. Sofaer, supra note 1, at 467.
35.Id. at 478-79.
36. id. at 479.
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United States has already "approved" and "accepted" its Proposal, the
general contours of which are set forth in Sofaer's article.'
Thus, this Note will examine what the United States has actually
"accepted" and whether this acceptance represents a departure from United
States practice in its past relationship with the Court. A comparative
analysis of the Proposal's second and third steps, the second concerning the
selection of treaties and subject matter and the third concerning Special
Chambers,' is required to determine whether the Proposal represents
substantive change, or continuity.
IV. JURISDICTION BY CONSENT: SPECIFICATION BY STATES
OF TREATIES AND SUBJECT MATTER AS TO WHICH
JURISDICTION MAY BE EXERCISED
The portion of Sofaer's article dealing with the selection of treaties
and subject matter is entitled "Jurisdiction Based on Consent." " As a
preliminary matter, it is necessary to forestall the potentially misleading
effect of this title. The jurisdiction of the Court, whether based on a
declaration under article 36(2) of the Court's statute, a compromissory
clause under article 36(1), or a special agreement, always originates in
consensual action by the parties.'
A state depositing a declaration
accepting compulsory jurisdiction has consented to jurisdiction as to all
disputes concerning the subjects enumerated in article 36(2) concerning any
37. The Soviet Union recently presentedthe United Nations General
Assembly with a
memorandum containing its own Proposal
for strengthening the Court's role in international
affairs. SeeLewis, Soviets
UrgeStronger RoleforWorld Court,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,1989,
at
A4, col.
1. TheSoviet Proposalcontains three
elements
whichappear
tobedirectly derived
from the United StatesProposal:the provision of a treaty which wouldbind allsignatory
countries to submit disputesto the Court if all other methodsof resolution havefailed, a
proposalthat all
the members
of the Permanent
Five bind themselves
to sucha treaty, anda

proposal
thatthePermanent
Five give theCourt
jurisdiction to adjudicate
disputes
in "certain
categories." Id. TheSoviet Proposal
differs in regard
to thestagein a dispute
atwhich
the
Courtwill beimplicated. UndertheSoviet Proposal,
countries would berequired toopendirect
negotiations immediately upontheoutset
of thedispute. Id. ifsuch
direct negotiations failed
to resolve
a dispute,
other stepssuchas bringing in anoutside
mediator, appointing a
reconciliation commission
or bringing thedispute
to theUnited Nations Security Council would
betaken.Id. Finally, if all
these
methods
proved ineffectual, theparties
would berequired
to
submit
their disputeto theCourt.Id.
38. Sofaer,sapra note 1,at480. insubmitting the Proposalin its presentform to the other
members
of thePermanent
Five,
theUnited States
hasoffered its
own conception of whatform
acceptance
of theCourt's jurisdiction
should take.SeeU.S.,
in Shif, supra
note 2.
39. Sofaer,
supra
note1,at 479.
40. S.ROSENNa,supra note24, at 313-14.
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past, present, or future declarant accepting the same obligation. ' This is
also the case with regard to negotiated treaties in which the parties consent
2
to jurisdiction as to particular disputes relating to treaty obligations.
Finally, the element of consent is obviously present where parties specially
43
agree to submit their disputes to the Court. One scholar has noted that
states generally consent to the Court's jurisdiction by becoming members
of the United Nations." Thus, in this section, Sofaer is discussing the
nature and scope of a state's consent rather than the existence of the
consent itself. Sofaer states that in order "[t]o offset the uncertainty
created by general submissions to the Court's jurisdiction, we propose that
each party list, as specifically as practicable, the treaties.., over which it
45
confers authority on the Court to adjudicate." He then goes on to state
in the same section that "[a] second measure to ensure that the Court acts
upon the basis of consent is to write into the governing instrument a
provision affirmatively excluding issues concerning hostilities, armed
conflict, individual and collective self-defense, or resistance to aggression."
The United States is currently committed to seventy-one treaties,
bilateral and multilateral, that contain compromissory clauses designating
7
the Court as the forum for dispute settlement.
The United States will
undoubtedly select these to compose its proffered list." This result can
be viewed as necessarily following from basic treaty law for excluding
certain treaties would not be practicable, as it would nullify their respective
41. Id. at 370-71.

Id. at 314.
43. Id.
42.

44. 1 G. FtncuRIc,
JusncE 492 (1986).

THs LAW AND PROCEDUREOF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF

45. Sofaer, supra note 1, at 479.
46. Id. at 480.
47. See Morrison, supra note 19, at 58. Morrison lists 70 treaties but does not include the
Genocide Convention to which the United States recently became a party in 1988. See also

United States: Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Nov. 4, 1988, 28 LLM. 754
(1989).
48. There has already been an indication of this in a New York Ties article discussing
the Proposal. See Lewis, U.S. Asking, supra note 2.

Legal officials said the plan was submitted to the Soviet Union about threeweeks
ago and included three main proposals. The first involves sixty international treaties
and conventions accepted by both nations. The United States is already bound to
let the World Court arbitrate disputes over their meaning, although the Soviet Union
has refused to do so.
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compromissory clauses.? The addition of treaties that provide for
alternative modes of dispute settlement would similarly disrupt the integrity
of those instruments.? Therefore, with respect to the treaties that the
United States is willing to place within the Court's jurisdiction, the
Proposal appears to represent no substantive departure from past United
States practice. The second half of this Proposal, however, which excludes
issues concerning hostilities, armed conflict, and individual and collective
5
self-defense, ' may have a significant impact on the nature and scope of
the original consent embodied in the respective compromissory clauses of
52
these treaties.
Before considering this matter, it would be helpful to
discuss briefly the types of treaties that comprisie this particular class of
treaty (i.e., that class whose treaties contain compromissory clauses) and
to consider the kind of jurisdictional authority each type confers on the
Court. If each type of treaty concerns generally benign, nonmilitary
subject matter, then the exclusion of belligerent subject matter contemplated by the Proposal will produce no substantive change in the character of
these treaties as a class. Fred Morrison has divided these treaties into five
53
major categories. This Note will employ his categorical scheme.
49. By excluding a treaty containing a compromssory clause from the international
agreement contemplated by the Proposal, the United States would, in effect, be unilaterally
nullifying that treaty's compromissoryclaue. This is tantamount to a unilateral revision of a
treaty in force, an action which no treaty signatory may take absent some provision in the treaty
permitting its unilateral revision. See A. McNAiR, LAw Or TRAnEs 534 (1986).
50. The rule of customary international law respecting treaty revision is that a treaty may
not be revised without the consent of all the signatories. See 1. SINCLA.t, THE VIENNA
CONvcrtION ON THE LAw OF TaFATEs 106 (2d ed. 1984). While the Vienna Convention
under certain conditions permitsparties to multilateral treaties to modify a treaty by n inter
se agreement, such an agreement could only take place after the Permanent Five's approval of
the Proposal. Id. at 108-09. Furthermore, the United States has presented its Proposal without
an addendum offering to amend or modify a treaty in force which does not contain a
compromissory clause. I.
51. Sofaer, supra note 1, at 480.
52. The Proposal's international agreement, if brought into force, may have the effect of
inserting an exclusionary clause in each deposited treaty. If so, this will give rise to the same
problem regarding unilateral treaty revision discussed earlier. See supra notes 45, 50 and
accompanying text. Sofaer does not address this potential problem in his article but it will
doubtless become an issue, if it is not already one, should the Permanent Five approve the

Proposal.id.
53. Morrison, supra note 19, at 62. These categories consist of three groups of bilateral
treaties and two groups of multilateral treaties. Id. The bilateral treaties consist of 16 treaties
dealing with economic cooperation; 15 treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation; and
3 consular conventions. Id, at 64-65. The multilateral treaties consist of 26 treaties that codify
developments in international law. Id. at 65. While Morrison mentions the Genocide
Convention as falling within this particular group of treaties he does not add it to the list
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A. The Treaties
The first category comprises sixteen bilateral treaties that the United
States entered into following World War II for the purpose of promoting
economic cooperation.'
The compromissory clauses for these treaties
typically grant the Court jurisdiction to settle disputes that relate to
5
governmental measures affecting contract and property.
Significantly,
these treaties state that the commitment of the signatories to adjudication
by the Court is limited to the terms and conditions of each signatory's
6
declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
The second category comprises fifteen bilateral treaties of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, which are also denominated treaties of Amity,
7
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights).
These treaties primarily
grant each signatory the right, while in the other's country, to engage in
8
commercial activities.
Their compromissory clauses give the Court
jurisdiction over disputes as to the interpretation and application of the
particular treaty.'
The third category comprises three bilateral treaties, two of which are
consular conventions and one dealing with cooperative development of
because, as of the date his article was written, it wasstill under consideration by the United
States. Id. at 66. Since theConvention is now international law with respect to the United
States it may properly be added to the list, bringing the total in this group to 27. The second
group of multilateral treaties consists of 10 treaties establishing specialized international
organizations, such as the World Health Organization and the International Labor Organization.

Id.
54. id. at 62.
55. Article VIII of the bilateral treaty with Israel provides in part:
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Israel
agree to submit to the decision of the International Court of Justice ... any claim
espoused by either Government involving compensation of one of its nationals
against the other Government for governmental measures affecting property rights,

Including contracts or concessions.
Technical Cooperation, May 9, 1952,U.S.-Israel, art. VII, 3 U.S.T. 4174, T.IA.S. No. 2561.
56. The portion of article VIIIdealing with dispute settlement provides:
Itis further understood that the undertaking of the Government of the United States
of America in respect of claims espoused by the Government of Israel pursuant to
this article is made under the authority of and is limited bythe terms and conditions
of the recognition by the United States of America of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court.
Id.
57. Moreison, supra note 19,at 78.
58. Id. at 64.
59. Id.
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water resources.'e The compromissory clause of the consular convention
with Korea
excludes matters falling within the discretion of either
6
signatory. 1
The fourth category comprises twenty-seven multilateral treaties that
Morrison calls "legislative" since they codify international law for the
parties.'
Of particular relevance in this group is the Convention on
Offenses Committed on Board Aircraft whose compromissory clause
contains the reservation that permits any signatory to deem itself not bound
by the clause.' Also of interest is the Genocide Convention, the United
States instrument of ratification for which contains an understanding
relating to armed conflict and a reservation to the compromissory clause
requiring the specific consent of the United States before the Court can
adjudicate a dispute under the treaty.
The final category contains ten multilateral conventions establishing
international organizations.' These conventions create an assembly or
council for hearing disputes concerning the interpretation or application of
the particular convention, but also provide for review by the Court if a
dispute cannot be resolved.'
B. The Exclusionary Nature of the Proposal
Now that the various types of United States treaties granting the Court
jurisdiction have been set forth, the potential impact of the exclusionary
facet of the Proposal can be considered. If the nature and scope of the
original consent of these treaties excludes the same species of disputes as
60. Id. at 79.
61. Article 16provides in part:
Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention
.. maybe referred, at the option of either party, to the International Court of
Justice for decision, provided (I) that rnatters falling within the discretion of either
party nder the Convention shall not be subject to the Court's jurisdiction.
Consular Convention, Dec. 19,1963, United States-Korea, art. 16,14 U.S.T. 1637, T.I.A.S. No.
5469.
62. Morrison, supra note 19, at 65.

63. Article 24(2) provides in part: "Each state may at the time of signature or ratification
of this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does notconsider itself bound by the
preceding paragraph (designating the Iternational Court of Justice as the forns for dispute
settlement)." Convention on Offenses andCertain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, art. 24(2), 20 U.S.T. 2942, T.I.A.S.No. 6768.
64. Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 754 (1989).
65. Morrison, supra note 19, at 81.

66. Id. at 67.
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that excluded by the Proposal, then the Proposal's exclusion of belligerent
subject matter does not represent a substantive change from the previous
position of the United States with regard to treaty-based jurisdiction.
1. Economic Cooperation Treaties
Reference to the subject matter of the treaties falling within the first
category, as well as to their compromissory clauses, reveals that they are
not concerned with disputes involving any of the excluded subject matter.
The treaties were entered into in order to promote economic cooperation
between the parties.'
The compromissory clauses give the Court
jurisdiction only as to disputes involving governmental measures that affect
contract and property rights." Furthermore, the compromissory clauses
are restricted to the terms of each signatory's declaration accepting
m
compulsory jurisdiction." The United States Declaration's Connally
Reservation restricts justiciable disputes to those not falling within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the United
70
States. Thus, if the Court attempted to construe any of these treaties as
covering a dispute concerning any of the excluded subject matter, the
United States Declaration could very well operate to frustrate such an
attempt. While none of these treaties has ever been invoked to invest the
7
Court with jurisdiction, ' the inclusion of the self-judging declaration
tends to demonstrate that the United States was concerned with forestalling
2
such an expansive construction.
2. Commercial Activities Treaties
The subject matter of the second category of treaties-commercial
activities-also appears to exclude from its ambit disputes concerning
hostilities, armed conflict, individual and collective self-defense, and
resistance to aggression. Their compromissory clauses give the Court
67. Id. at 62.
68. See text accompanying note 55.
69. As the Court has not considered coy dispute arising under these treaties, however, the
continued vitality of the United States Declaration remains a matter of speculation. While the
United States Declaration terminated in April 1986, it maycontinue to live through these
compromissory clauses. See Morrison, supra note19,at 64.
70. United States Declaration, supra note 8, at 64.
71. Morrison, supra note 19,at 64.
72. Morrison states that this limitation was included becauseof the Senate's historic
insistence that it participate in coydecision to submit matters to intemational arbitration. Id.
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jurisdiction only as to the interpretation and application of the particular
treaty.' Nevertheless, in two cases that arguably implicated the excluded
subject matter, Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.) and Tehran Hostages (U.S. v.
4
Iran), the Court's jurisdiction was partly founded on two treaties falling
5
within the category under consideration.
In the Nicaragua case, the
United States objected to the Court's jurisdiction founded on the compromissory clause of its Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaty (the
FCN treaty) with Nicaragua on the ground that the treaty, properly
interpreted, was limited to commercial relations and did not extend to the
6
alleged military activities. The United States referred to article XXI(I)
of the treaty which, in its view, excluded military activities from its
scope.' Clearly, the United States had never intended these treaties to
be a basis for jurisdiction as to disputes concerning the Proposal's excluded
subject matter.
The view of the United States appears to be that these treaties do not
embrace belligerent subject matter. The United States case against Iran,
however, which involved the forcible seizure of the United States
embassies in Tehran and consulates in Shabriz and Tabriz, as well as the
kidnapping of their diplomatic, administrative, and technical staff and two
private citizens of the United States, can surely be viewed as a dispute
8
involving the use of force.
While the general category of "use of
force," however, does include hostilities, armed conflict, individual and
collective self-defense, and resistance to aggression, the Proposal's
0
exclusionary facet only contemplates these specific situations.
It does
not include seizure of hostages, acts of terrorism, or the accidental
destruction of commercial airplanes; all of which fall under the general
category of "use of force." While, arguably, seizure of hostages or acts of
terrorism could be subsumed under "hostilities," Sofaer, immediately after
73. Id.
74. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nir v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14(Jurisdiction); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S.v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3.

75. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21,1956, U.S.-Nic., 9 U.S.T. 449,
T.I.A.S. No. 4024 (terminated, effective May I, 1986); Treaty of Amity and Economic
Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15,1955,U.S.-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
76. Chaney, Compromissory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 81 Am.J. INT'LL. 855, 881 (1987).
77. Id.
78. Schachter, Disputes Involving the Useof Force, in Tan INTERNATIONAL
COURT
OF
JUSTICE
ATA CROSSROADS,
supra note 19, at 223.

79. Sofaer, supra note 1,at 480.
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listing the excluded subjects, states that "[p]arties could be permitted to
agree, however, to extend the new treaty regime to such matters in
particular circumstances."'
A "particular circumstance" that justifies
extending the Court's jurisdiction to matters concerning hostilities may be
when such an extension will serve the overriding interest of combatting
terrorism. It is significant in this regard that the Tehran Hostages case is
the only case arguably concerning hostilities or the use of force over which
the Court derived its jurisdiction from any United States treaty with the
8
consent of the United States. '
If any change in the commitment of the United States to the Court is
to be conceded as reflected in the Proposal in comparison with the Tehran
Hostages case, it must be one of reduced rather than increased commitment
to the Court. This change may be called "negative substantive change."
The United States would therefore be removing matters from the Court's
purview that it previously was willing to commend to it. If this is the case,
it appears to be contrary to Sofaer's interest in securing "the broadest
2
possible acceptance of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction."' It is also
contrary to the reports of statements made by State Department officials to
the effect that the Proposal represents a positive shift in the attitude of the
United States towards the Court." On the other hand, a certain temporary
diminution in the Court's jurisdictional authority may be necessary to the
implementation of a realistic program whose objective is initiating an
eventual and full reacceptance of the Court.
Apart from the Nicaraguaand Tehran Hostagescases, the only other
case in which an applicant invoked an FCN treaty's compromissory clause
is the United States suit against Italy for the nationalization, in 1968, of a
plant in Palermo owned by the Raytheon Corporation, an American
electronics company." The United States alleged that, under the FCN
5
treaty, it was entitled to compensation for Italy's action. The Court, in
July 1989, decided in Italy's favor and denied the relief requested.' This
80. Id. Note that Sofaer reserves this ight to the parties,
not the Court.

81. On May 17,1989,
lran
filed
an Applicatioo instituting proceedings against
the United
States for the July
1988 downing of anIranian
airbus over the Persian Gulf.
See 28 t.L.M. 843
(1989). Soanelaitmsthat the Court has jurisdiction on the basis
of the Chicago Convention of
1944 andthe Montreat Convention of 1971.Id. The United States andIran,
however, arestill
awaiting a Court
request for the filling
of pleadings. Id Therefore, itis unknown
whether the
United States will
submit
to the Court's
jurisdiction. Id
82. Sofaer, supranote 1,at 478.
83. Lewis, U.S.,in Shift. supranote 2.
84. Case Concerning Ellectronica Sieula S.p.A.
(ELSI) (U.S.
v.Italy),
1988I.C.J.158.
85.Lewis, U.S., in Shift, supranote 2.
86. The Media Business; World CourtRulingfor
U.S.,N.Y. Times, July
21,1989,
at D18,
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case, which was in essence a dispute over the alleged taking of property
and did not involve any of the excluded subject matter, is clearly within
the United States commitment to the Court as conceived by the Proposal.
3. Consular Conventions
The third category of treaties consists of two consular conventions"r
and a treaty with Canada concerning the development of the Columbia
River's resources." The consular conventions provide conditions for
admitting consular officers to the parties' respective territories and establish
9
reciprocal rights, immunities, and privileges.
The subject matter of
these treaties are plainly nonbelligerent and, therefore, comport with the
Proposal's terms.
4. "Legislative" Multilateral Treaties
The fourth category of treaties are those multilateral treaties Morrison
calls "legislative" in that they codify international law for the parties.'
The subject matter of these treaties, in contrast to the bilateral treaties, are
of a diverse variety. The twenty-seven include conventions regulating the
9
distribution of narcotic drugs, the political rights of women, preven93
tion of sea pollution, offenses committed on board aircraft,' and the
col. 3. The case, however, represents a partial victory for the United States because the Court
rejected Italy's claims that the FCN treaty, one of 60 the United States has signed with
countries around the world, did not protect against seizures like that involved in the case. Id.
The verdict, therefore, is a vindication of the Bush Administration's contention that the FCN
teaties serve to shield billions of dollars in United States investments abroad. Id.
87. Consular Relations, Sept. 2, 1969, U.S.-Br1g., 25 U.S.T. 41, T.I.A.S. No. 7775
[herinafter Consular Relations]; Consular Convention, Dec. 19, 1963, U.S.-Korea, 14 U.S.T.
1637, T.I.A.S. No. 5469 [hereinafter Consula Conventions].
88. Columbia River Basin: Cooperative Development of Water Resources, Jan.17, 1961,
U.S.-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S.No. 5638.
89. Consular Relations supra note 87, at 43; Consular Convention, supra note 87, at 1638.
90. Morrison, sapra note 19, at 65.
91. Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic
Drags, July 10, 1933, 48 StaL 1543.
92. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, July 7, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S.
No. 8289, 193U.NT.S. 135.
93. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, Dec. 8, 1961,
12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S.3.
94. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraf supra
note 63.
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95

prevention and punishment of genocide. The compromissory clauses of
these treaties typically grant the Court jurisdiction over disputes relating to
6
their interpretation and application. Most of the subject matter for these
treaties may be seen as lying outside the scope of the Proposal's exclusionary language. Article 1(4) of the Convention On Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft provides: "This Convention shall
"
not apply to aircraft used in military ... services. ' Article 4 provides
that "[a] Contracting State which is not the State of Registration may not
interfere with an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over an offense committed on board except in the following
8
cases: ... (c) the offense is against the security of such State."
This
treaty also provides that a signatory, in the instrument of ratification, may
deem itself not bound by its compromissory clause."
The Genocide Convention affords a glimpse into the psychology of the
United States commitment to the Court with respect to disputes of a
politically sensitive nature. It demonstrates, in alignment with the
Proposal, that disputes concerning hostilities, armed conflict, self-defense,
and resistance to aggression are, in the view of the United States, matters
outside the Court's jurisdiction. Article II designates certain "acts
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
te
ethnical, racial or religious" group as genocide.'
Article IX provides:
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for
genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III,
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute.'
95. Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
79 U.N.T.S. 277.
96. Morrison, supra note 19, at 66.
97. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, sapra
note 63, at 2943, art. 1(4).
98. Id. at 2944. Thus, only in the extreme case of a threat to a signatory's security may the
signatory interfere with an aircraft in flight. Id. Even in this extreme case (the existence of
which may give rise to a dispute), the language of article 1(4)precludes application of the treaty
to aircraft used in military services. f at 2943.

99. Id. at 2952, art.24(2).
100. Convention onthe Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
95, art.II.
101. Id. art. IX.
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On November 4, 1988, Congress enacted the implementing legislation
required by the United States instrument of ratification as a precondition
to accession.t" The ratification instrument contains five understandings,
two reservations, and the declaration making the enactment of implement03
As was stated, one understanding
ing legislation a requirement.
concerns acts committed in the course of armed conflict and one reservationrelates to dispute settlement under article IX. The armed conflict
understanding provides "[tihat acts in the course of armed conflicts
committed without the specific intent required by Article II are not
" °
sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by the Convention. " The
reservation to article IX provides "[tihat with reference to Article IX of the
Convention, before any dispute to which the U.S. is a party may be
submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this
article,1 5°the specific consent of the United States is required in each
case.
The understanding and reservation denote the concern of the United
States with preventing a recurrence of its experience in the Nicaraguacase,
in which the Court adjudicated matters connected, in the opinion of the
The proponents of the
United States, with ongoing armed conflict."t
reservation on the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations explained
only that the reservation was "meant to address situations in which it was
clear in advance that adjudication of a dispute by the ICJ would be
"
contrary to the national interest. t"" In a portion of\the Senate Report,
however, the opponents of the reservation cited the Nicaragua case as
motivating theinclusion of the reservation."e One commentator has
suggested that the understanding relating to armed conflict reflects a
concern of the United States that its enemies would charge it with having
committed genocide in Vietnam and that the Court might entertain such a
claim."m Whether or not this concern is unwarranted, the understanding
respecting armed conflict demonstrates the revulsion with which the United
supra note 64.
102. Genocide Convention Implementation Actof 1987,
103. Id. at 774.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106.
U.S. State Dep't Statement, supra note 27.
107. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., tStSes. 18(1985),
reprinted in 28 IM. 754 (1989).

108. Id.at 775.
States,6 Wisc. INT'L LJ.
109.
LeBlanc, The ICJ,
the Genocide Conwention, andthe United
43, 46 (1987).
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States regarded the submission of disputes concerning armed conflict to the
Court. The sentiment finds its expression in the portion of the Proposal
under consideration.
5. International Organization Treaties
The treaties in the fifth and final category have as their subject matter
the creation of various international organizations."'
Their compromissory clauses typically consign disputes to the organization's judicial
organ, either an assembly or council.'
The extent of jurisdictional
2
authority granted under these treaties is therefore limited."
These
limitations, however, are not expressive of a fear that the Court will
adjudicate sensitive matters. They are merely a means of preserving the
self-contained character of these organizations. Thus, to the extent that
these treaties already confer jurisdictional authority on the Court, their
inclusion pursuant to the Proposal does not represent a departure from past
United States practice.
C. Substantive Continuity with Past United States Practice
The foregoing analysis of bilateral and multilateral treaties demonstrates that their probable inclusion within the binding international
agreement provided by the Proposal will represent virtually no substantive
change from past United States practice vis-a-vis the treaty-based
jurisdiction of the Court.
Substantive continuity may also be shown by an analysis of past
United States practice with respect to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
and the jurisdiction vested in it by the special agreement of the parties.
Before undertaking this analysis, the peculiar position occupied by the
Nicaraguacase in contributing to and shaping the United States conception
of the Court's jurisdiction renders it deserving of special attention.
The Nicaraguacase involved claims and defenses that fit neatly into
3
the Proposal's exclusionary section." Therefore, focusing on the United

110.

Morison, supranote 19, at 66.
111. Id.

112. Id
113. Nicaragua claimed that the United States policy of supporting a mercenary any,
launching attacks on Nicaraguan territory and attempting to overthrow its government were acts
of forcecontrary to the United Nations Charter, the OAS Charter, and the general principles of
international law. Chayes, Nicaragua, the United Stares, and the World Court, 85 COLUM.
L
REV.1445, 1445 (1985). The United States argued that its actions constituted collective self-
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States objections to the Court's determination of the admissibility (i.e.,
4
justiciability) of these claims. will establish that the aversion of the
United States to the Court's adjudication of disputes concerning the
excluded subject matter can be traced to this case. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the Nicaraguacase very likely prompted the inclusion
5
of the Proposal's exclusionary section."
In itsCounter-Memorial,"' the United States argued that Nicaragua's claims were inadmissible because, by their nature, they were
exclusively committed by article 39 of the United Nations Charter to the
7
Security Council."
Similarly, the United States also argued that since
"Nicaragua is, in effect, demanding that the Court adjudicate a claim of
'aggression' or, at the very least, a claim of the ongoing use of armed
force contrary to the Charter in or against Nicaragua," then "the Court
would necessarily have to decide whether or not the countervailing claims
(by the U.S. and other States) of the exercise of the right of individual or
collective self-defense are without merit, or that the right recognized and
guaranteed by Article 51 of the Charter (guaranteeing States an unimpaired
9
8
The
right of self-defense)"
in this regard is not implicated.""
defease under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Schacter, supra note 78, at 227. The United
States maintained that Nicaragua had attacked El Salvador in providing arms, military guidance,
and technical support to the Salvadoran insurgents and that the United States had a right to
come to El Salvador's aid. Id.
114. Nicaragua did of coursebasethe Court's jurisdiction on its own Declaration and that
Schacter, supranote 78,at 277. the
of the United States accepting compulsory jurisdiction.
United States objections to this jutisdictional basis,
however, were (1)that Nicaragua's 1929
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the PermanentCourt of International Justice was
legally
defective and therefore left the country without an effective declaration necessary to
invoke the United States Declaration, (2)that the Vandenberg Reservation to the UnitedStates
Declaration excluded disputes which affected memhes tomultilateral treaties who were parties
to the dispute (here, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica were the memhea and the
"multilateral treaties" were the U.N. Chatter and the OAS Charter), and (3) that the United
States had effectively modified its Declaration on April 6, 1984 tosuspendits operation as to
suitsrespecting eventsin Cented America. See Counter-Memorial of the United States
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nic. v. U.S.), 11-17, 105-20, 131-35 [hereinafter Counter-Memorial]. The United States
reserved its arguments relating to the Court's competence to adjudicate disputes concerning
armed conflict, collective self-defense, and resistance to aggression for the issue of the
admissibility of Nicaragua's claim. Id. at 186.
115. Sofaer, supranote 1,at 480 & n.87.
116. Counter-Memorial, supranote 114, at 186.
117. Article 39 of the U.N. Charter provides: "The Security Council shall deterrine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breachof the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make
recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTae art. 39.
118. 1d.art.51.
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United States then contends, "[a]rticle 51 permits only the Security Council
to take action with respect to claims of self-defense, and a judgment on the
question by the Court would constitute an entry into the field of competm2
tence reserved to the Council in this regard."
Clearly, the sentiment giving rise to the Proposal's exclusionary
section was present in full force in the United States Counter-Memorial for
the Nicaragua proceedings. On January 18, 1985, the United States
withdrew from the Nicaragua proceedings in response to the Court's
decision, on November 26, 1984, to assert jurisdiction over Nicaragua's
2
claims.' ' In a statement following the withdrawal, the State Department
voiced the same sentiment that was expressed in the United States CounterMemorial. This time, however, the sentiment was held to have existed
since the United States Declaration was submitted in 1946: "[t]he ICJ was
never intended to resolve issues of collective security and self-defense and
When the United States accepted the
is patently unsuited for the role....
Court's compulsory jurisdiction in 1946, it certainly never conceived of
such a role for the Court in such controversies."'
Whether the United States had never, at least since accepting
compulsory jurisdiction, conceived of the Court's role as excluding the
competence to adjudicate such disputes, and presumably those involving
hostilities and armed conflict, is a question that may be answered by
reference to the cases involving the United States brought to the Court on
the three jurisdictional grounds: declaration, compromissory clauses, and
special agreement of the parties.
1. Cases Brought Under the 1946 Declaration
The United States Declaration of 1946 stated that the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction extended to all legal disputes hereafter arising
concerning the subject matter of article 36(2) of the Court's statute.'"
In The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice, Shabtai
Rosenne states:
[Iln a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction for
disputes 'hereafter arising,' a single date determines the date as
note 114,at219.
119.Counter-Memorial, supra
120. Id. at 220.
121.

supra note 27.
U.S. StateDepartmentStatement,

122. Id. at 64.
123. United States Declaration,supra note 8,at 90.
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from which the obligation to accept the compulsory jurisdiction
is assumed in general and 'ratione personae' (as to parties) and
the date as from which the scope of that obligation exists in
relation to a concrete dispute, 'ratione materiae' (as to subject
matter).12
By drawing a temporal line at the year 1946, the United States
effectively excluded all disputes that arose before that date. This includes,
of course, the Second World War. The listing of an exclusion date
eliminating matters arising from both World Wars was a device also
employed by the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Sudan, Israel, and
1
South Africa. " Rosenne states that to the effect of the exclusion date
must be added the "subjective domestic jurisdiction exclusions found in
post-war declarations" (Connally Reservation-type clauses) of declarants
26
including the United States.
Thus, the unwillingness to submit matters
involving hostilities, armed conflict, individual and collective self-defense,
and resistance to aggression, all of which aptly characterize the war against
the Axis powers, is vividly apparent from the language of the United States
Declaration.
The cases brought under the United States Declaration by and against
the United States, excluding the Nicaraguacase, are the Case Concerning
27
the Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco,' the Aerial
29
Incident of 27 July 1955,' and the Interhandel case.
A consideration of these cases may prove helpful in assessing the United States
conception of the role of the Court with respect to its compulsory
jurisdiction. This view can be compared to the Court's role as expressed
in the Nicaraguacase and reflected in the Proposal's exclusionary section
with a view to determining whether any change is discernible.
a. The Rights of Nationals Case
The Rights of Nationals case concerned a dispute between France and
the United States over certain diplomatic and economic privileges, which
124. S. ROSENNE,supra note 24, at 400.

125. Id. at 402-03.

126.Id.
127. Case Concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (France v.
U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176.
128. Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955(U.S.v. Bulgaria), 1960 I.C.J.146.
129. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.CJ. 6.
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the United States enjoyed under early treaties with Morocco."' France,
as Morocco's mandatory power since 1917, demanded that all other States
3
relinquish their treaty privileges in Morocco.' ' The United States would
not capitulate to France's demands and negotiations between the states
132
were ineffectual.
The United States protested when Morocco enacted33
trade legislation in 1946, which was unfavorable to the United States.
France, in response, instituted proceedings against the United States."
The Court rendered a judgment resulting in a compromise whereby the
3
United States retained most, but not all, of its former privileges.
Both
countries promptly complied with the Court's judgment'
While the
subject matter at issue in this case-economic and diplomatic privileges-is unrelated to the Proposal's excluded subject matter, the United
States Counter-Memorial contains the following passage concerning the
Court's role in the maintenance of peace:
Recourse to judicial settlement in international affairs is quite
often considered essentially a means of settling disputes between
States which might create international friction or endanger
international security. This emphasis upon the maintenance of
peace as the primary function of the technique of judicial
settlement is perfectly justified, of course, in light of past
37
experience.'
The passage, at first blush, appears to express a sentiment concerning
the Court's role in international affairs diametrically opposed to the
sentiment the United States harbored during the Nicaraguaproceedings and
that indicated by the Proposal's exclusionary section. This passage,
however, can be read to reveal a willingness on the part of the United
States to submit disputes to the Court only before they assume a belligerent
character. Arguably, the United States is suggesting that the Court's utility
130. D'Amato & O'Connell, United States Experience at the InternationalCourtof Justice,
in THEINTERNATIONAL
COURT
OFJUSTICE
ATA CROSSROADS,
supra note 19, at 408.
131. id.
132. lId
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.

137. Rights of Nationals of the United States of Amerta in Morocco, 1952 I.C.J. Pleadings
52 (Counter-Memorial of the United States of America) 257 (emphasis added).
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lies in its ability to forestall situations of armed conflict or hostilities. The
sentiment expressed in the Nicaraguacase and implicit in the Proposal that
such matters are committed to the Security Council under article 39 of the
United Nations Charter is consistent with this interpretation of the passage.
In the Hostages case, the United States instituted proceedings against Iran
while tensions between the countries had not escalated into a situation of
full blown armed conflict. It is doubtful that the United States would have
remained willing to submit the same dispute to the Court had a state of war
existed between the United States and Iran. Finally, the Rights of
Nationals case, whose subject matter could in no way be described as
belligerent in character, was not the proper crucible to test the foregoing
passage's sentiment.
b. The Aerial Incident Case
Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 involved a dispute arising from
Bulgaria's downing of an Israeli civilian airliner whose passengers included
nationals of the United States.'
The United States instituted proceedings against Bulgaria, but the Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction
because Bulgaria's declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the
9
Permanent Court of International Justice, had lapsed.
The United
States persisted in an attempt to persuade the Court to reconsider whether
4
it had jurisdiction.' 0 Bulgaria retaliated by reciprocally invoking the
Connally Reservation against the United States and
4 claiming that the
incident fell within Bulgaria's domestic jurisdiction.' ' The United States
initially argued that the Reservation was subject to a rule of reasonable
interpretation, but later withdrew the argument
in fear of damaging the
142
self-judging character of the Reservation.
The subject matter of the Aerial Incident case presents a definitional
problem analogous to that considered in connection with the Tehran
Hostages case. Both arguably are matters falling under the general
category of "use of force" and the specific category of "hostilities." The
discussion concerning the Tehran Hostages case therefore appears
applicable here. The difference here, however, is that the United States
withdrew from this case to protect the Connally Reservation from an
138. 12 M. WHrEMAN, DIGESTOF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 1306 (1971).

139. ld.
140. Id.

141. It
142. D'Amato & O'Connell, supra note 130, at 41I.
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erosion, which would have precluded its prospective application to disputes
deemed inappropriate for the Court to adjudicate.
2. The InterhandelCase: Invoking the Connolly Reservation
The Connolly reservation was invoked for the first, and only time, in the
3
Interhandel case, which involved a dispute over title to corporate stock.'
The case had its origin, however, in the United States federal courts.'"
Interhandel, a Swiss corporation, sued the United States in a United States
District Court to recover shares of the G.A.F. Corporation that the United
States had vested in 1942 as German assets pursuant to the Trading with the
4
Enemy Act.'
The District Court dismissed the complaint and the Court
of Appeals affirmed.s While Interhandel's writ of certiorari was pending
in the Supreme Court, Switzerland instituted proceedings against the United
States in the International Court of Justice, espousing Interhandel's
7
complaint.'
The Court avoided confronting the invocation of the Connolly Reservation by upholding another preliminary objection of the United
States relating to admissibility, to the effect that the Swiss government had
1
failed to exhaust its local remedies. ' Arguably, because it dealt with the
seizure of enemy assets during World War II, the Interhandel case presents
an instance where the Connolly Reservation was applied to remove a dispute
involving armed conflict from the Court's jurisdiction-'
Seen in this
light, the invocation of the Connolly Reservation was directed at a dispute
falling within the exclusionary facet of the Proposal. As such, it represents
an action consistent with the Proposal's terms.
143. Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 l.C.J. 6, 34.
144. Societd lnterationale v. McGranery, IIt F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953), affid, 225 F.2d
532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), reaff'd, 243 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1957), ree'd,357 U.S. 197 (1958).
145. Jillson, Federal and International Proceedings-United States Acceptance of
InternationalCourtofJustice CompulsoryJurisdiction,58 MICH.L. REv. 467,468 n.9 (1960).
146. Id. at 469 an. 17-20.
147. Id. at 467-68.
148. Id. at 468.
149. The GAF ntocks were vested under the Trading With The Enemy Act, 40 Slat. 411
(1917), as amended, Fm War Powers Act, 55 Stat. 839 (1941), which provided that title to
enemy owned assets acquired by the United States were to vest in the Alien Property Custodian.
Id. A critical question in the Interhandel case was the enemy or aenenemy status of 1(G.
Chemie Farben, a holding company later to be known as Interhandel. Jillson, supra note 145,
at 468 n.10. Although interhandel was a Swiss company, it had been formed by I.G.Chemsie
Farben, a German chemical trust company. Id. The question of interhandel's status therefore
trmed on whether German ownership terminated before the United States declared war on
Germany in 1941. Id
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3. Cases Submitted to the Court by Special Agreement
The Gulf of Maine case, one example of a dispute submitted to the
0
Court by special agreement," provides a subject matter completely
consistent with the Proposal, which contemplates future submissions of
disputes of such a neutral character. In the case, the Court resolved a
longstanding dispute between the United States and Canada by establishing
a boundary through the Gulf of Maine."'
In contrast to Gulf of Maine, the United States submitted other disputes
to the Court by special agreement, which became open offers to agree to the
Court's jurisdiction, namely, those disputes with the Soviet Union, Hungary,
t
and Czechoslovakia during the late 1950s. " The dispute with Hungary
arose out of the Hungarian detention of a United States Air Force plane and
53
its crew after they entered Hungary's airspace.
The disputes with the
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia involved similar incursions into foreign
airspace, but, in these disputes, armed attacks were conducted on United
States aircraft resulting in casualties."15
These cases strongly support the argument that the United States was
willing, at least at some time, to submit disputes concerning hostilities,
armed conflict, and self-defense to the Court. Unfortunately, the United
States was unable to vest the Court with jurisdiction because the respondents
had not deposited a declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction and were
not bound by any compromissory clause of a treaty covering these
disputes.'" Finally, the respondents had not accepted the open invitation
of the United States and, in fact, maintained that the United States application was "totally unfounded.""
The argument that these cases demonstrate a willingness on the part of
the United States to submit to the Court disputes of a belligerent character
is open to skepticism. It is not unlikely that this willingness resulted from
the virtual certainty that the respondents would never accede to the Court's
jurisdiction over these disputes. If this is the case, then the United States
150. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(U.S. e. Canada), 1984 I.CJ. 246.
151. Id
152. Treatment in Hungay of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of America, 1954
I.CJ. 99, 103; Aerial Incident of Oct. 7, 1952, 1956 I.CJ. 9; Aerial Incident of March 10, 1953,
1956 IC.J. 6; Aerial Incident of Nov. 7, 1954, 1959 I.C.J. 276.
153. D'Arnato & O'Connell, supra note 130, at 409.
154. Id. at 410n.31.
155. Id. at 408-09.
156. Aerial Incident of March 10, 1953, 1956 IC.]. 6, 7-8. (Czech.).
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application instituting proceedings against these countries may simply have
been a political stratagem designed to enhance the stature of the United
States, and correspondingly to diminish that of the respondent countries, on
the global political stage.'" With the possible exception of the Tehran
Hostagescase, the United States never again, despite the myriad opportunities open to it, instituted a proceeding against another country over a dispute
of a belligerent character and, in fact, vigorously resisted adjudication of
Nicaragua's claims against it. Nevertheless, if the United States, in
instituting proceedings in these cases, was not motivated solely by the
prospect of political gain, but also from a genuine belief that the proper role
of the Court extends to settling disputes of a belligerent character, then the
exclusion of the same, or at least closely related, subject matter in the
Proposal represents a negative, substantive change from past United States
practice. In this regard, as discussed with respect to the Tehran Hostages
case, Sofaer's statement that the "parties could be permitted to agree,
however, to extend the new treaty regime to such matters (those excluded in
"
the Proposal) in particular circumstances s' is also relevant to the decision
by the United States to institute proceedings concerning the aerial incidents
of the early 1950s. Viewed in this light, the action by the United States is
in accord with the Proposal's terms.
V. RIGHT OF PARTIES TO REQUEST A SPECIAL CHAMBER
AND PARTICIPATE IN ITS CoMPosresON
In the portion of Sofaer's article which concerns the election of ad hoc
Special Chambers, Sofaer states:
A third fundamental element must be built into any viable scheme
for the Court. This is the right of any party to request a Special
Chamber for dealing with a particular case constituted under the
Court's rules. To accomplish this, a clear procedure should be
established by which the parties to any case in which at least one
side demands a Chamber would jointly recommend to the Court the
size and makeup of the Special Chambers sought.'
157. See Hudson. Thirty Years of the WorldCourt, 49 Am. J. INT'LL. 1, 8 (suggesting that
the United Statesattemptto involve the Courtwas in reality an act of publicity). Butsee
D'Amato & O'Connell, supra note 130,at410(finding Hudson's assessment
'too narrow" and
stating that the United Stateswaswilling to resolvedisputeswith the Eastpeacefully, through

theCourt).
158. Sofuer, supra note1,at450.
159.Id.
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Sofaer's use of the phrases "must be built" and "a clear procedure should
be established" creates the potentially misleading impression that the notion
of parties requesting a Special Chamber and recommending that Chamber's
size and makeup is yet to be implemented. Sofaer later partially removes
this impression by discussing past use of Special Chambers'" as well as
briefly mentioning in a footnote that the phenomenon of Special Chambers
originated in the 1946 Statute of the Court, and that the "Court's rules gave
the parties little influence in the constitution of the Chamber until their
revision in 1973.""' In fact, a clear procedure has been established for
the use of Special Chambers and the recommendation of its size and
makeup. Article 26, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Court's statute (drafted in
1945) provide:
2. The Court may at any time form a Chamber for dealing with
a particular case. The number of judges to constitute such a
Chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of
the parties.
3. Cases shall be heard and determined by the Chambers provided
o
for in this article if the parties so request.'"
Article 27 of the Court's statute provides that a judgment rendered by
6
any of the Chambers shall be considered as rendered by the Court.t
Judge Schwebel, in his article on ad hoc Chambers, has observed that
while article 26 paragraph 2 does not accord the parties a determinative
voice in the composition of an ad hoc Chamber, at its drafting it was
viewed as affording the parties a voice in its composition.'
Sofaer,
however, is correct in pointing out that the parties had little influence in
the Chamber's composition until the revision of the Court's rules in
197 31
Sofaer is alluding to article 26 of the 1972 Rules of Court,
which became article 17 of the 1978 Rules. Article 17, which is virtually
identical to its predecessor, provides:
160. Id. at 481-82.

161. Id. at 491 n.88.
162. 1 Statute, supra note 5, art. 26, paras.2-3.
163. d art 27.
164. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambersin the International Court of Justice, 81 Am.J. INT'LL.
813, 834 (1987). Schwebel refers to Judge Hudson's statement that the 1946 statute's system
regarding Chambers was "wholly different" from the statute of the Permanent Court of Justice
which did not permit parties to determine the number or composition of the Chambers. id.
165. Sofaer, supranote 1, at 491 n.8.
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1. A request for the formation of a Chamber to deal with a
particular case, as provided for in Article 26, paragraph 2,of the
Statute, may be filed at any time until the closure of the proceedings. Upon receipt of a request made by one party, the President
(of the Court) shall ascertain whether the other party assents.
2. When the parties have agreed, the President shall ascertain
their views regarding the composition of the Chamber, and shall
report to the Court accordingly ....
3. When the Court has determined, with the approval of the
parties, the number of its Members who are to constitute the
Chamber, it shall proceed to their election, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 18, paragraph 1 (providing for secret
ballot).'"
In his article on the 1972 amendments to the Rules of Court, Judge
Arechaga characterizes the change with regard to Chambers as according
the parties a "decisive influence in the composition of ad hoc Cham"
bers.
"'l Arechaga also states that the Court retains "ultimate control
over the composition of any Chamber" since it must elect its members by
secret ballot."' He notes, however, that in practice it.
is difficult to
conceive that a majority of the Court would elect the members in disregard
1
of the parties' expressed wishes. " This comports with the Proposal's
grant to the parties of a voice in the Chamber's composition in providing
that the parties would "jointly recommend to the Court... the makeup of
the Special Chamber sought."'
Sofaer himself acknowledges the
precatory nature of the parties' recommendation of the Court's makeup by
citing, with approval, Judge Schwebel's statement that parties7 are"not
altogether free to determine the composition ... of the Court." '
In light of the foregoing, the suggestion in the Proposal that "a clear
procedure should be established," presumably within the binding interna166. 1978 Rules of Court, reprinted in S. RossNNE, PROCEDURE IN ThE INTERNATIONAL
Couar op JusTicE 38 (1983).

167. Arochaga,The Amendnents to the Rules of Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,2 (1973).
168. Id. at3,

169. Id.
170. Sofaer, supra note 1, at 480 (emphasis added).
171. ld.at482.
Softer quotes Schwebel
to rebut the argument
that use ofad hocCbaruers
will "turn the Court into a seriesof ad hoc tribunals."
id.
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tional agreement, for the parties to recommend the size and makeup of the
Chambers is superfluous. Such a procedure, as Sofaer's allusions attest,
already exists in the form of article 17 of the Court's rules in conjunction
2
with article 26, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Court's statute.' Therefore,
what Sofser must mean by a "fundamental element . . . built into any
viable scheme for the Court" is that the parties approving the Proposal
incorporate within the binding international agreement ("scheme for the
Court") the procedure currently available for the creation of Special
Chambers.
This Note is concerned with ascertaining whether the Proposal
represents any substantive change in the nature of the commitment of the
United States to the International Court of Justice. The foregoing analysis
demonstrates that the section of the Proposal being considered is entirely
consistent with the provisions of the Court's statute and rules pertaining to
the formation of ad hoc Chambers, at least since the 1972 revision of the
73
Court's rules.
In order to establish that this section of the Proposal
represents no substantive change in the United States commitment to the
Court, it is therefore necessary to show that the United States has observed
and supported the relevant provisions of the Court's statute and rules in the
instances in which the United States has sought to settle a dispute by
means of ad hoc Chambers. If the United States has followed these
provisions in the past, then the Proposal-which adopts the substance of
the existing provisions-represents substantive continuity with past United
States practice in electing to use ad hoc Chambers.
The United States has requested use of ad hoc Chambers in two cases:
74
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area' and
75
the Case Concerning EllectronicaSicula S.p.A. (ELSI).
The Chambers
used in these cases were formed in accordance with article 26, paragraph
176
2, of the Court's statute and articles 17 and 18 of the Court's rules.
While these cases are of recent vintage, the United States was an early
advocate of the use of ad hoc Chambers pursuant to the Court's statute and
172. ICJ Statute, supra note 5, art. 26, pars. 2-3.

173. The 1972 and 1978 revisions to the Rules of Court provide a mechanism for the
formation of Chambers which gives the parties the opportunity to recommend the composition
of such Chambers. Id. at 72. The Proposal likewise gives the parties requesting Chambers the
opportunity to recommend their composition. Sofaer, supra note 1, at 480.
174. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Oulf of Maine Area
(U.S. v. Canada), 1982 I.C.J. 3 (order constituting chamber).

175. Case Concerning Ellectronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1988 I.C.J. 158
(order constituting chamber).

176. 1982t.C.J.3, 4; 1988 I.C.J. 3, 4.
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rules.'" In 1971, when the United Nations General Assembly solicited
views and suggestions on enhancing the role of the Court, the United
States expressed its views regarding the formation of ad hoc Chambers.
Judge Schwebel discusses the view of the United States in his article:
The United States supported 'the establishment and wide use of
ad hoc Chambers of the Court for legal problems requiring
expertise in technical areas, and for peculiarly regional problems,
for whose solution all parties prefer to address a regionally
oriented bench.' The United States continued:
'The Court has adequate authority to create such Chambers under
the present Statute; liberal exercise of that authority could make
the forum of the International Court of Justice considerably more
flexible and mobile, and its use less costly and formal.
To encourage use of such Chambers, States might write into
future treaties provisions referring disputes to a special chamber
rather than to the full Court, if appropriate .... .'"
The final quotation is echoed in the Proposal's requirement that the binding
international
79 agreement contain a provision referring disputes to a Special
Chamber.
Observance by the United States of the Court's statute and rules with
regard to Chambers is evident in the circumstances surrounding the
formation of the Special Chamber to hear the boundary dispute in the Gulf
of Maine case."
The United States Agent in that case, Davis R.
Robinson, together with Deputy Agent David Colson and an assistant legal
adviser at the State Department, Bruce Rashkow, stated in an article
concerning the case that the United States was first drawn to the idea of
requesting the formation of a Chamber by Judge Arechaga's portrayal of
the Chamber procedure in his article on the 1972 amendments to the
Court's Rules.t' In response to criticism over the fact that the Chamber,
which was elected entirely in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
177. Schwebel, supra note 164, 836-37.

178& Id. Schwebel quotes from Review of the Role of the International Cor
Report of the Secretary General, UN Doe. A/8382, at 46-47 (1971).

of Justice,

179. Sofaer, supra note 1, at 480.
180.

1982 I.CJ. 3, 11.
181. Robinson, Colson, & Rashkow. Some Perspectives on Adjudicating Before the World

Court: The GubfofMaine Cae, 79 AM. J. INT'LL. 578, 581 (1985).
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2

United States and Canada,
was comprised solely of North American
and Western European judges, Robinson, Colson, and Rashkow reply that
"the parties did not in any way preordain that result .....
Moreover, the
parties should be free to mselect members of a Chamber within the Court's
Rules and prerogatives.""
This demonstrates that, in the Gulf of Maine
case, the United States adhered closely to the Court's rules respecting the
formation of Chambers.
Further evidence that the United States strictly observed the Court's
statute and rules relating to Chambers is supplied by its interpretation of
the treaty under which the Gulf of Maine case was specifically referred to
the Court." Article IlI of the United States/Canadian Treaty of March
29, 1979 states that the vacancies on the Chamber would be filled "in a
manner acceptable to the parties."'
The Court, which ordered the
formation of the Gulf of Maine Chamber, was concerned about a possible
conflict between this reference in the treaty and article 26 of the Court's
statute, article 17, paragraph 3 (last sentence), of the Court's rules, and
article 18, paragraph 1, of the Court's rules.'" The Court solicited a
response from the parties relating to this concern."' The United States
and Canada, in assuring the Court that no conflict existed, stated:
Article E11of the Treaty is wholly consistent with the Statute and
Rules of the Court. The parties have at all times expected that
any vacancy on the Chamber would be filled in accordance with
the Statute and the Rules. The procedures set forth in Articles 17
and 18 of the Rules provide for ascertaining the views of the
parties and for a subsequent election by the Court in the case of
a vacancy (created by the absence of a member of the Court not
a national of either) ....
Article m1
of the Treaty in no way
interferes with the operation of these provisions."
Thus, the Proposal's section respecting the formation of Special
Chambers clearly reaffirms the commitment of the United States, at least
182. 1982 I.CJ. 3, 11.
183. Robinson, Coson, & Rashkow, supranote 181, at 583.
184. Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty with Canada, art III, T.LA.S. No. 10204 S, 33
U.S.T. 2797.
185. Id.
186. 1982 I.C. 3, 6. These provisions combine to require that vacancies in Chambers be
filled by "secret ballot." S. RosmNoq,supra note 5, at 272.
187, 1982 I.CJ. 3, 6.
18. Id. at 7.
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since 1971, to adjudication by Special Chambers of the Court in that the
Proposal contemplates formation of Chambers in a manner consistent with
89
the Court's rules and statute."
Since, in the recent past, the United
States has followed the Court's statute and rules in electing to use ad hoc
Chambers, absolutely no substantive change is represented by this section
of the Proposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The objective in demonstrating that the Proposal represents a
continuation rather than a change in the commitment of the United States
to adjudication by the International Court of Justice is not to denigrate but,
rather, to serve the Proposal in its underlying purpose. Sofaer articulates
that purpose (as the article's purpose) in the opening passage of his article:
A special opportunity seems at hand to promote the use of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in resolving international
disputes. The purpose of this paper is to suggest an approach to
that objective based on realism, rather than permitting this
opportunity to be lost through excessive faith or undue skepti190
cism.
In light of this avowed purpose, this Note has sought to present the
elements of the Proposal as a realistic portrait of the commitment of the
United States to the Court. The nature of this commitment is evidenced
by the nature of the subject matter and treaties over which the United
States has permitted the Court to exercise its jurisdiction since the Court's
creation in 1945. Further, the most salient feature of the commitment of
the United States in this regard is its consistent use of the Court as a forum
to adjudicate matters wholly divorced from situations of hostilities, armed
conflict, collective and individual self-defense, and resistance to aggression.
In the Nicaragua case and the Genocide Convention, the United States has
demonstrated how chary it is to submit disputes of a belligerent nature to
the Court for adjudication. Acknowledging that the parameters of United
States acceptance of the Court have been largely fixed is thus a precondition to adopting realism as the hallmark for approaching the matter of
enhancing the Court's role in international affairs.
The Proposal carries the inherent danger that the public, with the
189. Sofer, supra note 1, at 480.
190. Id. at 462.
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acquiescence of the Proposal's proponents, will portray it as representing
a "shift in attitude" on the part of the United States. This undermines the
prospects for the actual occurrence of such a shift in the future by
overburdening the Proposal with the task of meeting the inordinate
expectations of the present. This type of "excessive faith" in connection
t
with the Proposal has already manifested itself in the media. ' If any
shift in attitude is to be claimed as reflected in the Proposal it must be
expressed as a desire to enhance the role of the Court in the future by
eliminating the ambiguity and uncertainty which presently characterize the
commitment of the United States to the Court. The claims that the
Proposal represents anything more than this formal change undermines the
realism necessary to begin the work of increasing the relevance of the
Court in international affairs. These assertions also impair the prospects
of ultimately cultivating the trust and confidence among nations so that
each will observe its stated commitment to submitting disputes to the
International Court of Justice.
Michael Lizzi
191. The New York7imesstated: "American legalofficials said the Administration's
decision to take up the Soviet Union on its proposal for strengthening the World Court
represents a shift in its attitude toward the Cor and the concept of international arbitration."
Lewis, U.S.Asking, supra note 2; seeLewis, U.S.,in Shift, supra note 2 (article on Raytheon
Corporation case-Elltronica Sicula-whicb also discusses the Proposal entitled "U.S.,in
Shift, Asks Arbitration in World Court").

